1998 Security Refresher Briefing Cover

Presented by the
University Research Security Office
Laboratory Management
University of California
1111 Franklin Street, Oakland, California 94607-5206


 

ABOUT YOUR SECURITY BRIEFING

Your security clearance involves many responsibilities. This includes the requirement to be aware of basic guidelines about classification of information and about security.

This refresher briefing gives you the basics you must know about these subjects and is being provided to you as a reference. By reading the information in the briefing, understanding it, and returning an electronic acknowledgment (see end of this briefing for instructions), you will meet both Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) requirements that you receive periodic security refresher briefings. 

Willie C. Archie signature
Willie Archie
University Research Security Officer
Laboratory Management Office
Robert Van Ness
Assistant Vice President
Laboratory Management Office


 

WHAT IS THE ANNUAL SECURITY REFRESHER BRIEFING?


 

CONTENTS

  1. Personal Protection Measures Against the Terrorist Threat
  2. Foreign Intelligence Recruitment Approaches
  3. Reporting Requirements for Cleared Individuals
  4. DOE Listing of Sensitive Countries
  5. Reinvestigation of Your Security Clearance
  6. Summary/Wrap-up/Documentation


 Personal Protection Measures Against the Terrorist Threat

Historically, Americans normally worried about terrorism when traveling abroad. However, with the terrorist violence at the Pentagon and World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, we now know that terrorism can strike here at home as well. Hopefully, the information in this briefing will help you avoid becoming a victim of a terrorist incident.


Placing the Threat in Perspective

Acts of terrorism are usually performed to provoke widespread fear and attract the attention of the media. No one is immune to terrorism, anymore than we are immune to ordinary criminal violence. Conversely, we are not defenseless against terrorism. You can take positive steps to protect yourself and deter the terrorist.

Awareness is the key!

Elicitation

Elicitation is a collection of conversational gambits used in ordinary conversations in order to gain information without being obvious about it. Elicitation by foreign intelligence officers or terrorists is a commonly used and highly effective way of subtly collecting information through what appears to be normal, perhaps even mundane, social or professional conversation.

Be aware, and be ready to tactfully
deflect questions that are intrusive and too probing regarding your job, private
life and co-workers.

Conversing via Nonsecure Telephone

Pay special attention to Operations Security (OPSEC) considerations when communicating over nonsecure means of communications. Seemingly innocuous details can be transferred into intelligence information that could damage projects, programs, and activities. Additionally, any intelligence, resource, or equipment capabilities that were harmed or destroyed that would limit intelligence production or collection must not be discussed in any other manner than secure means. Adversaries pay close attention to observables to deduce critical information about your projects, programs, and activities. These exposed links to critical information help adversaries summarize the meaning of loose facts they collect.


Unattended Items

Be aware of your surroundings and report the locations of all unattended items such as luggage, gym bags, packages, boxes, etc., located near university or government facilities. It is extremely important that you NOT attempt to inspect the unattended items. Move as far away from unattended items as possible and leave inspections to trained personnel. Deadly bombs can be concealed in innocuous and relatively small packages or containers. These items may not appear to be threatening, but will be unattended and look out of place. Also, when traveling or attending public events, be alert to items left unattended. Immediately report any unattended items to the appropriate authorities.


Internet Security Awareness

Whether you use the Internet from work or home, security precautions are highly advisable to protect your identity as well as your data. Information about yourself and in particular your employment with the federal government or university should not be provided to Internet user groups, e-mail services, or other web sites. Adversaries can easily exploit such information about your identity and employer. Be aware of the security dangers inherent in these types of solicitations. Discussing work related material with an Internet group is prohibited under Executive Order 12958, pre-publication regulations, and operations security policies. Unsolicited e-mails are a good way for foreign intelligence services or terrorists to collect names, ranks, duty locations, job descriptions, IP addresses, and other valuable information on U.S. government personnel. This information could be used to launch computer network attacks and identify targets of opportunity against DOE and DOD persons and installations.

Suspicious Letters or Packages

Characteristics of suspicious packages or letters include:

  • Excessive postage
  • Handwritten or poorly typed addresses
  • Incorrect titles
  • Title, but no name
  • Misspellings of common words
  • Oily stains, discolorations or odor
  • Evidence of powdery substances
  • No return address
  • Excessive weight
  • Lopsided or uneven envelope
  • Protruding wires or aluminum foil
  • Excessive security material such as masking tape, string or binding tape
  • Visual distractions
  • Ticking sound
  • Marked with restrictive endorsements, such as "Personal" or "Confidential"
  • Shows a city or state in the postmark that does not match the return address

If you have any reason to believe a letter or parcel is suspicious:

Don’t
  • Open the item, shake or empty the contents.
  • Move the item from one location to another.
  • Shake, smell or taste any contents.
Do
  • Isolate the item and then leave it alone.
  • Evacuate the area.
  • Call for immediate assistance. If at home, immediately report the situation to local police. If at work, immediately report to your facility protective services.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Threat

Recent terrorist attacks in the United States have raised the possibility of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) attack. Staging such an attack, given weather, method of dispersion, and the environment is difficult.


Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear

Counterterrorism experts believe that the greatest threat remains conventional explosives. Terrorists may, however, have ready access to hazardous industrial chemical ingredients that could be used in an attack. If such an attack does occur, there are certain steps you can take.

  • First, try to remain calm (rapid respiration and perspiring increase the intake of toxic substances.)
  • Follow the directions of the First Responders including:
    • Security/Protection Officers
    • Fireman/HAZMAT Responders
    • Police
    • Emergency Medical Technicians or Health Officials
  • Evacuate to designated area.
  • If a portable inhalation device is unavailable, breathe through a handkerchief, scarf or other readily available clothing.
  • Proceed upwind from the affected (release) site.
  • Cover exposed skin with loose clothing: layers and less porous fabrics are best.
  • Don't touch contaminated persons or their clothing; leave that to the protected First Responders.
  • Seek treatment immediately.
  • Wash exposed skin as soon as possible. Keep handiwipes in office for use during evacuations.
  • Follow directions carefully. Depending on the chemical, the response can vary greatly.

The symptoms of a CBRN attack can range from mild to severe (e.g., sweating and a runny nose.)

Biological Attacks

The onset of a biological attack may be more difficult to determine. It may involve the release of a viral, toxic, bacterial, or other agent against humans, animals or food
products. The biological agent will have a delayed onset and generate symptoms days or weeks after exposure. The first indication of an attack may be infected or
exposed persons exhibiting similar symptoms at hospitals, clinics, doctors, or internal medical stations. Because some of these agents are contagious, infection may occur away from the targeted area and be carried to the target through normal human contact.

Aerosol biological attacks would most likely be accomplished in the predawn/early morning hours when winds are light and before air currents begin to rise due to the warming of the ground. Measures taken to counteract chemical attacks also provide protection from biological attacks.

For more information on CBRN attacks visit the following websites: Additional Preventative Actions

At Airports

  • Use concealed bag tags.
  • Follow all airport security procedures.
  • Proceed to gate as quickly as possible.
  • Keep low profile in dress and demeanor.
  • When questioned by airport personnel, be direct and honest.
  • Do not leave personal belongings unattended.

At Hotels

  • Do not give room number to strangers.
  • Choose an inside hotel room, preferably between the 3rd and 10th floors.
  • Leave lights on and a television or radio, when room is vacant.
  • Close curtains.
  • Do not use name, rank or title when answering the telephone.
  • Locate alternate exits in case of emergency.
  • Keep your room key/card in your possession at all times.

Be Alert!

The following list has been compiled from suggestions made by counterterrorism experts for use in security education to combat terrorism. Any of the following events might mean danger and should be a reason for an immediate report or for seeking advice from security or law enforcement officials:

  • Anonymous tips, phone calls or notes of a threatening nature, which may identify groups or carry extremist messages.
  • Surveillance by suspicious persons of federal offices or of federal employees. Unattended and unoccupied vehicles parked in unauthorized or inappropriate locations, particularly those in close proximity to building or other structures.
  • Request for plans, blueprints, or engineering specification for federal buildings or commercially owned buildings that house government offices, by person(s) without an apparent reason to have them.
  • Unauthorized access even to unsecured areas by unknown or unidentified persons who have no apparent reason for being there.
  • Confrontation with angry, aggressively belligerent, or threatening persons by federal officials in the performance of their official duties.

Living with the Threat

We live with many dangers in our daily lives, ranging from everyday household accidents to natural disasters. We do so without fear. Terrorism is n unfortunate fact of contemporary life, but we do not have to live in constant fear of terrorism anymore than other dangers. It is important to be aware of the threat in perspective.

Terrorists PREY on
Complacency and Inattention.
Security Awareness is the Key!



Foreign Intelligence Recruitment Approaches

Counterintelligence Office
Defense Security Service

What is Recruitment?

An intelligence definition of recruitment is the attainment of someone's cooperation to provide intelligence, usually after careful assessment and patient cultivation of the target by the intelligence service. By the time the "pitch" (the offer to work for the foreign government) is made, the intelligence officer (the "recruiter") is relatively confident of the target's willingness to cooperate.

If a failed recruitment attempt is reported, serious consequences may result for the foreign intelligence service officer. An involved Intelligence Officer who has diplomatic status may be declared persona non grata and expelled from the country; one without such status could face trial and imprisonment, if convicted.

If the target agrees to the recruitment, that person becomes an "asset" or "agent", i.e. he has become a spy. The Intelligence Officer, also called a "case officer," handles the asset by clandestinely receiving the intelligence, paying his agent, and guiding the asset in his illicit activities.

Why a person would betray his country is a complex issue, but money is almost always involved. Pursuit of financial gain often represents some other personal or psychological need such as ego enhancement, revenge, etc.


The Threat

The mainstay of most intelligence services the world over is the recruitment of well-placed assets who can provide insightful intelligence on a particular issue(s). Most sensitive jobs are of special interest to foreign intelligence services.

Despite the number of Americans who have initiated their own espionage careers and have volunteered to provide information to other countries, foreign intelligence services continue to invest considerable time and resources in assessing and targeting U.S. citizens for recruitment approaches. These approaches are almost never made impulsively, but are actually the end result of detailed planning and thorough assessment of the target. By the time the target is asked to work for a foreign intelligence service, the person is probably aware that a dubious relationship is developing.

This portion of the briefing is intended to help sensitize you to targeting by foreign intelligence services, assist you in recognizing and countering recruitment attempts, and advise you to immediately report any incident or questionable relationship. Your contribution to the collective security of the University of California, the U.S. Department of Energy, or the U.S. Department of Defense of the nation is vital.

Damage Potential

Indisputably, those Americans who have betrayed their country, regardless of whether they volunteered or were recruited to spy, have caused immeasurable damage to the security of the citizens of the United States. In some cases, lives were lost. In others, lives were destroyed. In all cases, lives were irreparably altered.

Americans who have spied have betrayed a special trust to the country, to their friends and colleagues, and to their families. Despite their personal rationale for their treason all had other means that were appropriate for fulfilling their aspirations, needs, and desires. Most, if not all spies, eventually regret their actions and their decisions to commit espionage.

No matter the circumstance, no matter what the motivations, working illicitly for a foreign intelligence service is indefensible and is never the right decision. Espionage is deceit, betrayal, manipulation, and results ultimately in destruction.

The Defense Security Service
Counter-Intelligence Field Specialist
Servicing this area is:
John Stoffel
Office: (707) 424-7659
Cell Ph: (916) 343-8504
________________________


Reporting

Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-12 requires that government employees report all contact with individuals of any nationality, either within or outside the scope of the employees official activities, in which:
  • Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information.
  • The employee is concerned that he/she may be the target of actual or attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.

Likewise, the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, paragraph 1-302b, states that "contractors shall report efforts by an individual, regardless of nationality, to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to classified information or to compromise a cleared employee. In addition, all contacts by cleared employees with known or suspected intelligence officers from any country, or any contact which suggests the employee concerned may be the target of an attempted exploitation by the intelligence services of another country, shall be reported."

Regardless of whether you are a cleared individual or not, the security of the nation rests on the prompt reporting of any suspicious contacts. If in doubt, contact your Facility Security Officer, unit CI office, or agency security office. The individuals staffing these offices can assess your information and determine if a potential CI concern exists.

DOE Programs
The Defense Nuclear Counter-Intelligence Officer DOE/OAK
Servicing this area is:
Steve Minniear
Office: (925) 423-9872
Pager: (800) 784-1856
Steve.Minniear@oak.doe.gov
________________________

Summary

Recruitment is usually a subtle and carefully orchestrated process to determine a person's receptiveness to working for a foreign government. If success is perceived to be possible, the pitch will eventually be made. Initially, an intelligence officer's interest in you may be imperceptible, but may become more obvious as the relationship develops.

Reporting questionable relationships, whether involving yourself, a co-worker, supervisor, neighbor, family member, or friend, is crucial to effective intervention. Espionage is never a "victimless crime." It damages lives and threatens the security of this nation. Notify the nearest DSS office should you have any indication that you or one of your coworkers may be the target of an attempted exploitation by a representative of another country.

Reports of actual, probable, or possible espionage should be submitted to the FBI.

For additional information regarding foreign intelligence recruitment approaches and targeting, review the DSS CI Office's publications, "Technology Collection Trends in the US Defense Industry" and "Suspicious Indicators and Security Countermeasures for Foreign Collection Activities Directed Against the US Defense Industry." Additionally, articles can be viewed and downloaded from the DSS Internet site at http://www.dss.mil/cithreats/

DSS thanks the National Security Agency's Security Services from whom much of this material was taken. This brochure has been approved for public release – PA #990702-02


All Department of Energy-Cleared Employees And Cleared Support Contractors Must Report Within Five Days The Following:

  • All arrest and criminal charges, including dismissed charges
  • Detentions by Federal, State or other law
  • Enforcement authorities for violations of law, within or outside of the United States
  • Traffic violations over $250.00
  • Personal or business-related filings for bankruptcy
  • Wage garnishments
  • Legal action effected for name change
  • Change in citizenship
  • Any employment, representation, business-related, or association with foreign owned interests and foreign nationals
  • Employment, representation, business-related association with a foreign or foreign-owned interest
  • Any continuing contact with foreign nationals
  • If, "You think you are a target"
  • 45 days after marriages or cohabitation
  • 45 days prior to any travel to sensitive countries
  • Immediately report all hospitalization or treatment for drug, alcohol, mental or emotional conditions

If you have any policy concerns with any of the above Reporting Requirements, contact Jessie A. Monroe (925) 422-2166, in the Safeguards and Security Division (SSD), NNSA, Department of Energy, Oakland Operations Office.


THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Listing of Sensitive Countries
for Security Briefing for UC Sponsored DOE Clearances


DOE lists certain countries as "Sensitive Countries". The UCOP Research Security Office requests that you notify the UCOP Research Security Officer 45 days before departure to (or person-to-person meetings with individuals from ) the following countries:

Algeria
China (People's Republic Of
Including Tibet and Hong Kong)
Cuba
India
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Libya
North Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
Pakistan
Sudan
Syria
Taiwan

Commonwealth of Independent States
*(Formerly the Soviet Union):

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzstan)
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

*Soviet Republics include the republics which constituted the Soviet Union in 1990 (except for Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania), whether or not now independent or joined in a union with other republics, and
any component territories of these republics which may consider themselves independent.

*THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: (COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES)1
Abkhazian Autonomous Republic
Adjarian Autonomous Republic
Adygeya Republic
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Altai Republic
Bashkir Republic
Belorussia
Buryat Republic
Checheia/Ingushetia Republic
Chuvash Republic
Crimean Republic
Dagestan Republic
Georgia
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region
Jewish Republic
Kabardino-Balkar Republic
Kalmyk Republic
Karachai-Cherkess Republic
Karakalpak Autonomous Republic
Karelian Republic
Kazakhstan
Khakass Republic
Kirghizia
Komi Republic
Mari Republic
Moldavia Republic
Mordovian Republic
Nakhichevan-Autonomous Republic
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic
North Ossetian Republic
Russia
Sakha Republic
South Ossetian Autonomous Region
Tajikistan
Turkemenistan
Tatarstan Republic
Tuva Republic
Udmurt Republic
Ukraine Republic

1 Statesman's Yearbook, Brian Hunter, 130th Edition, 1993-94, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993. (Dictated by phone on 10/11/94 via reference desk, Oakland Public Library, (510) 238-3136).



Reinvestigation of Your Security Clearance

Every five years you are required to undergo another full scope background investigation (SSBI) in order to retain your “Q” (or DOD Top Secret) security clearance. You will be notified when you are required to submit your reinvestigation application forms. When notified, the Department of Energy requires that you complete and submit the following forms via the University’s Research Security Officer:

Form Number Form Name
SF86 Questionnaire for National Security Positions
DOE F 5631.18 Security Acknowledgment
DOE F 472.1 Fair Credit Reporting Act
If applicable, the following additional forms must be completed at any time they apply:
DOE F 5631.34 Data Report on Spouse/Co-Habitant
(To be completed by individuals who are cohabitating in a spouse-like relationship).
Statement Representative of Foreign Interest Statement
(To be completed by any individual who holds a position with a foreign-owned company).


The above forms can be completed electronically, printed, signed in BLACK INK and forwarded to the University Research Security Officer to meet the requirements for your reinvestigation. The Research Security Officer must complete additional forms (Justification and File Summary Forms, etc.) in order to make your application acceptable. Questions concerning the completion of any the above forms can be directed to Willie Archie, University Research Security Officer on (510) 987-9846.


Summary/Wrap-Up

This completes your annual security refresher briefing for 2002. The briefing covered personal protection measures against the terrorist threat, recruitment approaches by foreign intelligence, and reporting requirements for cleared individuals. The refresher briefing reminded us about DOE’s listing of Sensitive Countries, and about our obligations for reinvestigation of our “Q” clearances every 5 years and which DOE forms are required.


Action for you

    Please email Willie Archie to acknowledge that you have read this version of the University of California 2002 Security Refresher Briefing. Include the following statement in the body of your message:

    I acknowledge receipt of the University of California 2002 Security Refresher Briefing in compliance with U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of Defense security requirements.

    It is important to include your name after the above statement.

    We will be contacting you if your email statement is not received by November 30, 2002.

    Thank you.

    willie.archie@ucop.edu